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There was a marked change in policing after the terror attacks on September 11, 
2001. While much research has examined this change in other areas of the country, less is 
known about how 9/11 impacted policing in Maine. To fill this research gap, the present 
study examined police officers’ perceptions of job change since the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
Data from semi-structured interviews with ten police officers were analyzed using 
focused content coding. The data analysis revealed three general themes that represent 
how police officers thought that their jobs had changed: (1) national security, (2) local 
policing, and (3) fusion centers. This paper concludes with recommendations for police 
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 There was a scramble in the law enforcement community in the aftermath of the 
terror attacks on September 11, 2001. Security and law enforcement agencies were 
unsure how to best protect the American people from this new type of terrorism. In 
response to this lack of preparedness, policing institutions were forced to reassess their 
methods for protecting U.S. citizens (Davis, 2010). For example, counterterrorism units 
were developed and deployed in large cities. These units were issued machine guns and 
allocated armored vehicles, and they received military training. Some large cities also 
partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create terrorism taskforces 
dedicated to those cities (Davis, 2010). 
Maine has no cities that are large enough to have experienced these changes; 
however, there are more subtle changes that are widespread throughout the country that 
are present in Maine. Intelligence-led policing has been one of these changes. 
Intelligence-led policing is the idea that police officers know the background and history 
of the person that they are interacting with before the officer encounters them (Gonzales, 
2005). Another change has been the federal 1033 program, which provides 
decommissioned military equipment to local law enforcement agencies. The result of this 
program has increased allocations to police forces in the theory of better arming police 
officers against the threat of terrorism.  
Another shift since 9/11 is that local police have become integral parts of the 
national security system (Schafer, 2009). They are responsible for investigating local tips 
reported by the public for terrorism credibility and passing on pertinent information to the 




Given those established changes, this study seeks to understand to what extent local 
police in Maine think their job has changed since 9/11, and if the officers think they have 
any impact on national security. In the current research 10 police officers in Maine who 
were officers on 9/11 were interviewed to determine if and how they thought their jobs 
had changed. In the following section I summarize the extant literature on intelligence-









 Intelligence-led policing is one of the biggest changes since 9/11. Intelligence-led 
policing is the idea that the police officer responding to a call-for-service knows the 
record of the person involved and has more information in general before police arrive 
(Gonzales, 2005). This policing strategy also involves analyzing all the information that 
has been gathered by police through prior contact and given to police by the public and 
using this analysis to identify people who are more likely to become repeat offenders 
(LeCates, 2018). Because the officer has more information before interacting with the 
person, intelligence-led policing is said to be the best way to operate in the 21st century 
(Price, 2013).  
 One of the most integral parts of intelligence-led policing is the fusion center. 
Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level in conjunction 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI. Since 9/11, 78 fusion 
centers have been established across the United States (Price, 2013). Each fusion center 
has its own mission statement and operates by the rules set by the state or municipality 
that it operates under. Even with these differences, the basic function of each remains the 
same: collect, store, and disseminate information across and between the federal 
government and state and local law enforcement agencies (“National Network of Fusion 
Center Fact Sheet,” n.d.). Members of the law enforcement community argue fusion 




 The fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center 
(MIAC) (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). MIAC was established in 2006 
by an executive order from then-governor John Baldacci. The mission of MIAC is: 
To collect, process, analyze, and appropriately share intelligence between the 
federal government and the State of Maine. This shall be accomplished through 
the combination of resources from principal agencies, and the establishment of 
relationships from all levels of government and the private sector (“Maine 
Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).  
There are some issues with the mission statement of MIAC. The mission statement does 
not define what “appropriately share” means, giving the officers who have access to the 
information a wide amount of leeway with a great deal of sensitive information (Mistler, 
2020). The mission statement of MIAC also does not include the word ‘terrorism’ even 
though fusion centers were established to help prevent another terrorist attack (Davis, 
2010).  
MIAC is housed in and funded at the state level through the Maine State Police. 
MIAC works with agencies to protect critical infrastructure and prevent terrorism. 
Critical infrastructure includes assets essential for the functioning of society and 
economy, such as communications, energy, food and agriculture, government facilities, 
transportation, and nuclear materials (“Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). MIAC also 
collects information that police officers use to combat the drug war, such as collecting car 
information of people who frequently travel between Maine and cities known to be 




 MIAC collaborates with local law enforcement and the public to see threats that 
law enforcement would ordinally miss. In 2010, DHS rolled out a new program called “If 
You See Something, Say Something” (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). This 
program relies on the public to inform local law enforcement if they notice anything 
suspicious or out of the ordinary. The DHS attempts to make it clear that suspicious 
activity is not dependent on a person's religion, race, or ethnicity. Examples of suspicious 
activity include unattended backpacks or packages, or someone breaking into a restricted 
area (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). 
All of these tips are reported and investigated locally. The tips credible for 
criminal activity remain at the local level while the tips credible for terrorism are passed 
through MIAC to the FBI. MIAC keeps records of all the information that is reported to 
them and can give that information to the FBI or local law enforcement agencies as 
needed (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). 
There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding MIAC. One issue is that 
the information that was being stored in MIAC was not secure. In June of 2020, the so-
called “Blueleaks” hacks occurred exposing the personal information of thousands of 
citizens that the fusion center had information on. All of this information was put on the 
internet for anyone to find (Rhoda, 2020).  
A second issue surrounding MIAC is the tactics that the center employed. A 
former trooper claimed that the fusion center was regularly breaking privacy laws and 
tracking people who were not breaking any laws. One alleged example was the fusion 
center keeping the personal information of people who were applying for gun licenses, 




A third ongoing complaint lodged against MIAC is that it is no longer focused on 
terrorism but instead works with police departments in investigating routine crimes, such 
as theft and drug crimes (Byrne, 2020). This activity is not in conflict with the mission 
statement of MIAC; however, there are people who believe the fusion center should be 
more focused on terrorism than on minor crimes (Mistler, 2015). 
MIAC has exhibited a significant amount of “mission creep” or intentional 
expansion of responsibilities at the fusion center (McQuade, 2019). MIAC was created 
with the intention to focus on terrorism and prevent a terror attack in Maine. The mission 
of MIAC has unofficially expanded to combating drug trafficking and monitoring people 
participating in protests. MIAC officials have used these new duties to argue that they 
should have more money and resources (Byrne, 2020). These new activities are done 
outside of the law that established MIAC (McQuade, 2019).  
 One of the more recent incidents of criticism involved MIAC's tracking of 
protesters in the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020 and the tracking of 
protesters of the Central Maine Power Corridor. There were bulletins issued about the 
activities of these ‘left-wing’ protests, and police departments were told to be on the 
lookout for violent activities from these protesters (Byrne, 2020). MIAC was accused of 
racial bias because it did not track any people involved in right-wing protests that 
exhibited that potential for more serious crimes because of the weapons possessed by this 
group of protesters (Tipping, 2020). The spokesman for MIAC denied that the center had 
a racial bias when it analyzed information on protestors and emphasized that MIAC did 
not collect the information. MIAC only stored information given to it by other agencies 




There has been a general criticism of fusion centers in that they keep more 
information about people of color and of religious minorities than they do for white 
people. Fusion center officials publicly make it clear that they protect the rights of 
minorities. Fusion center officials also claim that they receive more tips from the public 
through the “If you See Something, Say Something” program on people of color and 
religious minorities which explains the difference in the amount of information. The DHS 
makes it very clear that “Factors such as race, ethnicity, and/or religious affiliation are 
not suspicious. The public should report all suspicious behavior and situations (e.g., an 
unattended backpack or package, or someone breaking into a restricted area)” (“What is 
Suspicious Activity,” 2020). Despite this, people are more likely to report activity they 
deem to be suspicious when the person involved is of a religious or ethnic minority 
(Tipping, 2020). Nevertheless, racial complaints have been raised about MIAC numerous 
times and there are calls to investigate the agency on racial discrimination complaints 
(Mistler, 2020). 
MIAC officials claim there would be less controversy surrounding their 
operations if the public understood how the fusion center works. MIAC does not collect 
any information on its own, nor does it conduct any investigations; all MIAC does is 
compile information that is given to it through reports from the FBI’s “If You See 
Something, Say Something” program and information that Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs) collect (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). This information is 
analyzed and then kept on servers that are available for local police officers to search 
through when they pull someone over or are on a scene with a person who they deem 




a bulletin on this person that can be seen by all agencies with access to the system 
(“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).  
There have been many evaluations of fusion centers, their effectiveness, and 
options for where the nations go with fusion centers. The Congressional Research Service 
compiled a report for congress on the issues with fusion centers and the options that were 
available to congress for how to move forward. This report found that mission creep - 
going beyond terrorism and looking at more day-to-day crimes - is a problem for many 
fusion centers across the country. Fusion centers are no longer focused on terrorism and 
are now looking at more drug crimes and keeping track of people suspected of everyday 
crimes (Masse, 2007). The report also found that the initial proposal from DHS had more 
oversight intended for fusion centers including more strict requirements for information 
gathering. However, once fusion centers were up and running this oversight did not occur 
and fusion centers had more leeway than they were intended to (Masse, 2007).   
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also conducted an evaluation of 
fusion centers and found that there are many issues with fusion centers. The main issue 
that they found with fusion centers is that there are serious privacy issues with fusion 
centers because they have a combination of new technology and governmental powers 
that come with the war on terror. The analysis of the ACLU is that this results in 
unprecedented possibilities of infringements on civil rights (German, 2007). Another 
critique that the ACLU has is that fusion centers are not effective in preventing terrorism. 
The ACLU argues that fusion centers have been funded and implemented without the 
prerequisite research on if fusion centers are effective (German, 2007). The Senate 




report on fusion centers and evaluated that the effectiveness of fusion centers is low 
compared to the amount of money that is put into them (Barnosky, 2015). A third 
criticism that the ACLU found is that because fusion centers cross state, local and federal 
lines, they have ambiguous lines of authority. This allows fusion centers to engage in a 
practice of ‘policy shopping’ or looking for the regulation that fusion center leaders want 
to follow and using that as their guide. They most often pick the regulation that allows for 
the most amount of leeway (German, 2007). 
1033 Program 
 
The 1033 program, also known as the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), 
was established in 1997 but increased its operations in 2002. The 1033 program is a part 
of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) under the Department of Defense (DOD) and is 
one of the main ways that local police and the military are intertwined (“1033 Program 
FAQs,” n.d.). The program was created in response to demands from local law 
enforcement that they needed more weapons to combat terrorism. The purpose of this 
program was to take decommissioned and surplus military equipment and transfer it to 
local police departments in need of equipment and supplies. This program has provided 
more than 8,000 LEAs with surplus and decommissioned military equipment since it 
started (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). In 2019, $293 million in property was transferred 
to law enforcement agencies (“Law Enforcement Support Office,” n.d.).  
There are currently 8,200 LEAs that participate in the 1033 program (“1033 
Program FAQs,” n.d.). In order for agencies within a state to participate, the governor 
must appoint a coordinator for the state. After states have joined the program, agencies in 




agencies go through this coordinator before they go to the DLA. Requests must include 
justification as to why the equipment is needed. Requests are approved by the state 
coordinator as well as LESO personnel (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.).  
Once a request has been approved, the equipment is packaged and shipped to the 
local agency. LEAs do not pay for any of the equipment that they get from the 1033 
program, but they do have to pay for shipping (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). Once 
departments receive equipment, training is supposed to be set up for their officers on the 
proper use of the equipment and the situations in which it should be used; however, there 
is no accountability to ensure that this training occurs. This creates a problematic opening 
for officers to handle equipment without proper training or supervision (Musgrave, 
2014). 
The 1033 program has drawn three major criticisms in its history: (1) it is too easy 
for the police to get military equipment, (2) there is not enough oversight of the program, 
and (3) that police do not need this equipment. There have been many cases of 
departments receiving equipment that was disproportionate to the amount of people that 
they serve. For example, the Winthrop Harbor Police Department in Illinois, a town of 
6,700 people, received 10 helicopters, a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle 
(MRAP), two Humvees, and more than 6.5 million dollars in other equipment. Police in 
Johnston, Rhode Island, with a population less than 29,000, acquired two bomb disposal 
robots, 10 tactical trucks, 35 assault rifles, more than 100 infrared gun sights. A Los 
Angeles school district initially received three grenade launchers and more than 60 M-




(Musgrave, 2014). All these distributions highlight the issues with the 1033 program and 
the lack of accountability within the allocation process. 
 In order to show how easy it is for LEAs to get equipment and test the oversight 
of the 1033 program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) formed a fake LEA. 
This fake LEA applied for and were sent 1.2 million dollars in military gear including 
rifles and pipe bomb equipment. No one at the DLA did any research into this 
department. A simple Google search would have shown that this was a fake department 
(Hager, 2017). To add to this, some of this information only came to light because of a 
lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The DOD and LEAs did not want the 
general public to know how over-armed they are or about the mistakes that were made 
when handing out equipment (Musgrave, 2014). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that having more military equipment makes that 
community safer. A 2020 meta-analysis by Gunderson and colleagues (2020) found that 
there was no relationship between how much equipment a police department received 
from the Federal Government and the crime rate in the area that the department patrolled 
(2020). This suggests that police departments do not need the equipment that they have 
received from the federal government and could mean that the 1033 program should be 
terminated as it is ineffective at lowering the crime rate (Gunderson Et. Al, 2020).  
The 1033 program is not the only way in which military equipment is transferred 
to police departments. Certain pieces of equipment that LEAs cannot get from the 1033 
program can be obtained through different types of property transfers or grants. Included 
in this are military uniforms, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and any vehicle or plane that 




Program FAQs,” n.d.). These transferal programs are less transparent than the 1033 
program, so it is unknown how much or to where the equipment has been transferred. 
Police departments in the state of Maine have received more than 13 million 
dollars in equipment from the 1033 program since it was started. 79 police departments 
received rifles. 7 police departments - Caribou Police Department, Cumberland County 
Sheriff Department, Knox County Sheriff Department, Lewiston Police Department, Old 
Orchard Beach Police Department, Sanford Police Department, and Scarborough Police 
Department - received explosive ordnance disposal robots. Portland Police Department 
and Cumberland County Sheriff department both received armored trucks, and 
Cumberland County Sheriff Department and Sanford Police Department received mine 
resistant vehicles. Wells police department also received two boats to perform water 
patrols (Musgrave, 2014). Given all of the equipment that departments in Maine received, 
it is important to understand what impact the officers using the equipment believe that it 
has - which is what the current study seeks to do. Two-thirds of the departments from the 
officers that I interviewed received equipment. One department only received rifles and 
the other three departments received larger pieces of equipment.   
Policing Studies 
In the year following 9/11, the New York Police Department (NYPD) saw the 
most drastic changes to their overall policing structure. Bornstein used both qualitative 
and quantitative methods to examine the changes that NYPD officers experienced (2005). 
On 9/11 officers who normally ran background checks, drove prisoner busses, or taught 
at the academy were instead on the streets helping people and protecting the landmarks in 




to provide a greater show of force in the city. There was also a large display of high-
powered machine guns across the city in an attempt to deter any further attacks 
(Bornstein, 2005).  
 Broader quantitative studies have been done on the impact of 9/11 on policing in 
the rest of the country. One example of this is “Measuring Homeland Security Innovation 
in Small Municipal Agencies'' by Schafer and colleagues. This study looked at rural 
policing in Illinois and relied on data collected as a part of the Illinois Homeland Security 
Survey (2009). This study found that even though officials in rural departments rated 
perceived threats of terror to be low, the majority of departments have been taking steps 
to ensure that they are prepared for a terror attack. Some of these preparations have 
included assigning liaisons to other agencies, training staff on terrorism preparedness, 
and participating in terrorism-related field training exercises (Schafer, 2009).  
 The Council of State Governments also conducted a study to determine the impact 
of terrorism on the functions of state police (Foster, 2005). They collected survey data 
from the chiefs’ state and local police departments on their operational responsibilities, 
the federal agencies that they interact with, and employment patterns. The study found 
that more state police organizations (75%) thought that terrorism prevention was a part of 
their operational responsibility than local agencies (60%) (Foster, 2005). Even with these 
studies, there has never been a qualitative study that investigated individual officers’ 
opinions on their role in policing terrorism, national security, and other changes that may 








 This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature surrounding the effect of 9/11 and 
national security policing on law enforcement in Maine. There has never been a study 
done that focuses on policing in Maine. There has also never been a qualitative study 
done in this area which could lead to new insights at the individual level. This study 
seeks to fill this gap in the research by conducting semi-structured interviews with 10 









Table 1 Participants 
Name Age Education Rank Gender Region of Maine 
Sam 49 Doctorate Captain Male Southern Maine 
Jake 50 Bachelors Detective Male Southern Maine 
Brian 43 Associates Patrol Officer Male Southern Maine 
Nate 54 Bachelors Deputy Sheriff Male Southern Maine 
Conner 51 Doctorate Chief Male Eastern Maine 
Ryan 62 Bachelors Deputy Chief Male Southern Maine 
Sally 52 Bachelors Detective Female Southern Maine 
Mike 50 Masters Chief Male Southern Maine 
Peter 58 High School Trooper Male Central Maine 
Tony 42 Bachelors Lieutenant Male Southern Maine 
 
There were two inclusion criteria that all participants had to meet. All participants 
must have been employed in Maine as a police officer before September 11, 2001 and be 
currently employed as police officers in Maine. It was important that officers meet this 
second criteria so they could experience the full range of changes that the policing 
profession has experienced. The researcher contacted every police and sheriff's 
department in Maine, as well as the Maine State Police, to recruit participants. Contact 
information was found on publicly available police department websites. An email was 
sent explaining the study and asking if there were any officers in the department who met 




on behalf of their officers because of department policies, while others passed on 
information. Participants then contacted the researcher, and an interview was scheduled. 
The ten participants came from six different police departments.  
There are limitations to a small-N qualitative study. The main limitation is that the 
findings generated from a small sample size cannot be generalized to a larger population 
(Mahoney, 2000). This limitation applies to this study because of the small number of 
participants and these results should not be extrapolated to other states or other police 
officers within Maine.  
The specific aim in this study was to examine how these officers in Maine thought 
their jobs had changed since 9/11, as well as to understand the impact that these officers 
thought 9/11 had on policing in Maine. One advantage to a small-n study is that all 
interviews were heavily scrutinized, and the researcher was able to carefully examine 
each interview transcript.  
Interviews 
The author conducted semi-structured interviews with the participants. Semi-
structured interviews start with a set of initial questions but allow deviation to go more in 
depth when warranted (Regin, 2019). Seven interviews were conducted over Zoom or 
Skype, one was conducted over the phone, and two were conducted over email. 
Conducting any interviews face-to-face was impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The one phone interview was conducted because the participant was unable to figure out 
either Zoom or Skype. The two email interviews were conducted due to the availability 




Zoom, phone, and email interviews all have their advantages and disadvantages. 
Because of the more limited ability to press participants over email, a preference was 
given to phone and zoom interviews. In addition to this, neither phone nor email 
interviews allow the researcher to watch the participants when they are answering 
questions and pick up on subtleties such as body language and facial expressions. Email 
interviews also do not allow the researcher to pick up on intonation of the voice, which 
allows more insight into the thoughts and feelings of the participants (Archibald, 2019). 
There is some evidence that phone interviews make the participant feel more comfortable 
because the interviewer cannot see them, and they feel less judged (Block, 2012). 
On average interviews took 25 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 50 
minutes and the shortest lasting 20. The length of the interviews was on average rather 
short; however, all the questions were very focused and valuable information was gained. 
It would have been ideal for the interviews to last longer; however, many participants 
gave short, direct answers and were not willing to elaborate when pressed. Even though 
the interview time was short there were still many different views that were expressed, 
and valuable information was learned.  
Audio from the interviews was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. A set 
of initial questions was used with every participant, including demographic information 
(i.e., age, race, gender, rank, and marital status) and questions such as: What was being 
an officer like before 9/11? Where were you on 9/11? Were there any immediate changes 
to your job after 9/11?1 All the questions were focused on the topic of 9/11 and changes 




or no questions. Participants were asked to elaborate on yes or no questions. Clarifying 
questions were asked based on the answers of the participants. 
Analysis 
Transcripts were read three times in order to determine what the officers’ thought 
was important in each interview and to obtain analytical ideas. This was done through 
focused content coding. Focused content coding is a method for interpreting data where 
the interview transcripts are read in depth several times and a code - a word or phrase that 
captures what the participant was talking about - is assigned to each sentence (Saldana, 
2008). In this study all the interviews were fully coded. These codes were then grouped 
into categories based on similarities. The most prevalent categories became the themes 
for this paper.  
In this study there was only one coder. Because of the inexperience of the coder, 
the first three coded interviews were reviewed by an experienced researcher to ensure 
that the process was being done properly. After this, all interviews were coded by one 
coder. Reliability in qualitative research can be achieved by scrutinizing themes and 
features in the data multiple times, and by constantly shifting between the data and 
literature (Silverman, 2009). This was done throughout the coding process. In addition to 










Each participant was asked to reflect on how their jobs changed after 9/11. While 
each participants’ experience was unique, the data analysis revealed three themes present 
across the interviews: (1) the extent to which local and state officers were involved in 
policing national security; (2) the changing of the function of local police; and (3) the 
emphasis placed on intelligence collection and fusion centers. 
National Security 
After 9/11 many people in the federal government became obsessed with ensuring 
that an attack on that scale never happened again. DHS was created in an effort to 
achieve this goal and many people within the FBI were resigned to work on countering 
terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This extended to the state and local level, and 
programs were created to facilitate the passage of information between different levels of 
policing. 
Participants had different views on the significance of national security in their 
day-to-day jobs. Some officers were convinced that they were helping with national 
security, while others were adamant that the national law enforcement agencies did not 
want them involved. The majority of the participants were somewhere in the middle.  
Peter, an officer in the commercial traffic enforcement department, believed his 
unit played a significant role in protecting national security. Peter has worked in law 
enforcement since 1990 and has worked with the same department for his entire career, 
though he has had different positions within the department. When talking about national 




… I don't think that the type of heightened threat comes into play every 
day, we don't see that as much, but it is still in the back of your mind like 
what is going on. You're always keyed into it. Is this truck hauling 
something or is this driver doing something they shouldn't do - is 
something wrong? So, it is there, but the country has kind of relaxed from 
that aspect of the terrorist attack thing. Until you come across a driver that 
is on the terrorist watch list, or maybe on the watchlist - then that 
heightened sense of security comes back (October 1, 2020). 
 
Peter stated that he had come across a driver on the terrorist watch list a few times and 
that he had followed procedure by reporting it, but never knew what came of his actions. 
He was upset by this lack of follow-up from the Federal Government. Peter was the only 
officer that I interviewed who unequivocally thought that their job was now more 
oriented towards national security. This might be because of the unique position that this 
officer held: commercial traffic enforcement. Peter spends his days inspecting trucks and 
making sure that truckers in the state are following all the laws. Because of this, this 
officer interacts with many drivers daily. This officer stated that national security was in 
the back of his mind until he encountered a driver on the terrorist watch list, which was 
established as a result of 9/11. 
 Three officers felt that their jobs had some levels of national security involvement 
but not to the extent that Peter did. Ryan, who had been promoted several times since 
9/11, from a patrol officer in Southern Maine to the deputy chief of a different 
department in the same area, felt that he was only more aware of it because of his change 
in position: 
No, [we do not focus more on national security] except that in the position 
that I am in now I see the big picture a little bit more and I see how maybe 
something seemingly maybe inconsequential in a small municipal 
department may actually be a part of something bigger and contribute to 




Ryan described being more aware of the bigger picture and acknowledged how 
events that occur in his town could relate to larger events and could threaten 
national security. For example, how some of the 9/11 hijackers passed through the 
Portland jetport. A detective in Ryan’s department, Jake, had a slightly different 
view. He said:  
I don’t know if I would say that we have more of a focus on [national 
security] but we are certainly more aware of it. I’ll use an example. Every 
year... we have an event called the Christmas prelude. It is probably the 
biggest event that we prepare for, in the year. Six, eight, ten thousand 
people come in for this Christmas-time event. [After 9/11] we are more 
aware about large gatherings, a lot more goes into the planning of it. We 
think you know we are in this small downtown area, ...what if there was, 
you know somebody came down the middle of the street with a truck and 
started mowing people over. How do we react to that, how do we plan for 
that? ...We are more aware. Everyone learned to be more aware from 9/11. 
(September 9, 2020).  
 
Jake identified soft targets (places that are not protected by the military, relatively easy to 
get to, and create fear for everyday citizens that they could also become targets) as 
something that they think about more since 9/11 as well as being more aware that there 
could be a threat against civilians. The twin towers were hit because the destruction of 
them was designed to make Americans scared in their everyday lives. He also discussed 
terrorism preparedness for soft targets and crowded placed, something that was 
unimaginable before that day. 
Unlike Peter, Ryan, and Jake above, the next two officers thought that their jobs 
had nothing to do with national security. When asked if he thought that he was more 
involved with national security Mike, a chief of a Southern Maine department responded 




respond when asked to clarify in a follow-up), while Nate, Deputy Sheriff from a 
Southern Maine county stated: 
No. The federal government made it abundantly clear that local police 
departments were not to deal with national security. That was for federal 
law enforcement agencies to deal with. Local law enforcement agencies 
were not smart enough to deal with national security and there was a 
concerted effort to make sure that we were not involved, except in 
increasing security at strategically sensitive areas. That attitude continues 
to this day (September 16, 2020). 
 
The statement that these officers gave are completely false. The FBI and DHS rely on 
local police departments to give them tips on what is going on in their areas and 
countering violent extremism. It is possible that both Nate and Mike have had negative 
experiences with the federal government and that is why they have these opinions.  
 Overall, there was no consensus from the officers that I spoke to about whether or 
not their jobs were more oriented towards national security. One officer said that they 
definitely thought more about national security and actively participated in the process, 
two said that it did not at all, and the other seven fell somewhere in between.  
Local police changing 
 Since 9/11, there have been large changes to local policing in large cities such as 
New York City and Los Angeles. In policing atmospheres such as this, there have been 
task forces with the FBI established, officers deployed to prominent places with high-
powered weapons, and specialized counter terrorism units. There have not been changes 
to this extent in less populated areas; however, it is possible that there have been other 
changes in these less populated areas that are more subtle.  
There was not a unanimous opinion from this study about if and how local 




others felt that there were only changes in certain situations, and other officers said they 
saw no changes at all.  
 Sam, a captain from a Southern Maine department, who has worked in law 
enforcement since 1998, cited many changes that he had experienced: 
We are recording more. We are trying to connect the dots more often. And 
I think that as opposed to just going to a call, taking a complaint about 
something, and writing a report, it is interconnected. … We connect the 
data to other agencies. So, prior to going to a call, I am learning about 
what prior calls we have been on with this person, what have other towns 
responded to this person. We have a lot more data available to us as to the 
person that we are responding to (September 3, 2020). 
 
This is one of the few examples of an officer who thought that 9/11 had changed the way 
that their job looked on a daily basis. Sam gave an example of intelligence-led policing, 
the concept that police officers responding to calls for service know the history of 
interactions that this person has had with the police. This new technique has changed the 
ways that police operate on a day-to-day basis.  
Ryan, a deputy chief from a different Southern Maine department had a slightly 
different belief. When talking about how his job has changed since 9/11, he stated: 
I don't know that it has changed appreciably except with more of an 
emphasis on situational awareness, being more alert to things that are 
around you. Such as things like infrastructure, you know, people paying 
undue attention to things that are potential, would be potential terror 
targets, things like that. As far as the day-to-day job goes, I don't think that 
it has changed a great deal at all. At least here in a municipal police 
department. (September 30, 2020).  
 
This was one of the most popular opinions stated: that the day-to-day job had not 
changed at all, but the greater goals of policing had morphed into stopping terrorism and 




 I had expected this to break down along lines of rank, with officers in leadership 
positions (such as chiefs and deputy chiefs) thinking that their jobs had changed and were 
more oriented towards national security because these officers are in charge of looking at 
the big picture. I also expected that patrol officers and other officers on the streets from 
day to day would think that there was not a great deal of change. This expectation was 
true in some cases; however, not in all like that of Mike, a chief from southern Maine 
who stated:  
 I’m sure that for agencies with large populations … 9/11 had a necessary 
effect. Intelligence gathering in order to keep communities safe and stop 
threats took on a new urgency. For the vast majority of American police 
departments, 9/11 had little to no effect on our policing (October 19, 
2020). 
 
Mike drew direct comparisons between small-town and local policing and the 
type of policing that takes place in large cities. However, he also states that he did 
not see any change in the type of policing that his department does.  
Overall, there was no consensus that local policing was impacted by 9/11. There 
was a wide variety of opinions on whether local policing had changed or not. Two 
officers felt that their jobs were different on a day-to-day basis, while four others felt that 
the use of technology had changed the way that they interacted with the public. Four 
other officers expressed that there were changes, but that they were minor and did not 
actively affect their day-to-day jobs.  
Fusion Centers 
 Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level, in 
conjunction with DHS and the FBI. Each fusion center collects, keeps and disseminates 




fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC). 
MIAC was established in 2006.  
One finding that was consistent between the majority of the participants was that 
there was a new emphasis on intelligence collecting and information sharing. One officer 
from a Southern Maine police department was able to give this new emphasis a name; “I 
think we are more into intelligence-based policing and I think that is where the shift in 
policing has really occurred. I wouldn’t call it terrorism based so much as intelligence-
based.” Intelligence-based policing (also known as intelligence-led policing) is the idea 
that the police officers responding to calls for service know the record of the person 
involved and have more information before they arrive. This has been one of the biggest 
changes in policing that has come out of 9/11 (Gonzales, 2005). Two officers that were 
interviewed directly named intelligence-based policing and three others talked about it 
indirectly.  
One of the officers who talked indirectly about intelligence-based policing was 
Jake, an officer from another department in Southern Maine. He said: 
I would say the biggest change has been information gathering and 
sharing. Before you know a lot of people were kind of territorial over 
information that they had. So, let’s say that Maine State police were 
working on a case involving a guy that might be a threat or have terrorist 
ties or something like that, they would do their investigation and gather 
information, but they wouldn't necessarily share that with anybody. They 
were possessive of the information - we developed this information we are 
running with it and there is no need to share it. Since 9/11 one of the 
biggest changes, probably the biggest change, is the Fusion center 
(September 9, 2020).  
 





So, let’s say, like last summer we had some concerns about a guy that was 
in [place redacted] in [town redacted], he had some Middle Eastern ties 
and had created a scene over there. Well, we wanted to know is this guy 
just exercising his first amendment rights or this something that we should 
be really concerned about. Probably the first call would be to the fusion 
center to share that information, to get any information that they might 
have on the guy. So, it's a lot more sharing a lot better working 
relationships between agencies (September 9, 2020). 
 
This officer essentially described how the process of using a fusion center in a real-life 
policing situation. Fusion centers have greatly expanded the information that police have 
access to while they are working. This allows police to be better prepared.  
When Conner, a chief from a department in Eastern Maine, was asked if his job 
had changed since 9/11, he said:  
I would say no. There was larger talk about interoperability and 
communication. That seemed to be the first change that came out. There 
was not a great system in place for that before … Not as much [change] as 
I think we should have had. I think we have improved with the move, sort 
of going towards digital. and, but I don't know that we have done a great 
job, not inter-agency, but um … different disciplines - such as public 
works - and agencies that are not normal emergency response entities. I 
don't know that we have done a great job bringing them into the fold so 
that we have better communications with those groups as well during a 
large-scale event (September 18, 2020). 
 
This officer saw some changes in communication but felt that there was still room for 
improvement. In a different part of his interview, this officer also talked about the role 
that fusion centers play and the communication improvements that had occurred between 
his department and the intelligence sectors of the federal government. He also talked 
about the FBI’s ‘see something, say something’ program and the reliance that police have 




Peter, an officer who worked in a commercial traffic enforcement department was 
able to point to a concrete example of how the communication in his job had changed 
since 9/11: 
The FBI started the joint terrorism task force with Homeland Security, and 
they created a database of everybody driving a commercial vehicle within 
the US and there were certain people who could get licensing for certain 
things - like they were screening any drivers who were taking any like 
hazardous shipment any kind of dangerous things (October 1, 2020). 
 
All officers involved in commercial vehicle enforcement have access to this database and 
can consult it whenever they find a suspicious driver. Like fusion centers, this is a 
development in the goal of achieving national security. 
 The majority of the participants agreed that communication had changed greatly 
since 9/11, particularly with the federal government and the establishment of MIAC, 
Maine’s fusion center. The establishment of fusion centers has been one of the biggest 







 The FBI does not keep an official public list of domestic terrorist organizations, 
so it is impossible to know how many terrorist organizations are active in Maine 
(Bjelopera, 2017). There are lists compiled and made available by private entities. The 
Southern Poverty Law Center has published a list of anti-government movements in 
Maine. These include: The American Patriots Three Percent, a statewide organization. 
The Constitution Party, Maine Militia, Maine Volunteer Responders, Three Percenters, 
and We Are Change are all localized to specific towns or countries (“Anti Government 
Movements,” n.d.). These groups are all active in the state and have the potential to pose 
a threat to the public and the government (“Anti Government Movements,” n.d.). 
 The FBI has labeled “lone-wolf” attacks, (also known as leaderless jihad) or a 
person being radicalized and deciding to commit terrorism on their own, as a higher-level 
threat than attacks directed by a terrorist organization (Jenkins, 2011). This is because 
directed attacks are easier to detect as they are often accompanied by communications 
that can be monitored. There were a few years in the early 2010’s where the FBI was 
concerned that the rising population of Somali immigrants in Portland and Lewiston 
could have radicalized members and pose a risk for a domestic terrorist attack. After 
multiple investigations and years of monitoring activities, the FBI determined that there 
was little risk for radicalization among the Somali communities in Lewiston and Portland 
(Fisher, 2014). Based on this, it is likely that a terrorist attack in Maine would either 
come from a White Supremacist or from a person who does not live in the state (Fisher, 





 The results from this study can be broken down into three categories: national 
security, local police changing, and fusion centers. One notable finding is the lack of 
consensus among participants regarding two themes: national security and local police 
changing.  
National Security 
 First, there was no agreement between the officers on whether 9/11 led to 
increased attention to national security. The officers who stated they thought that the 
federal government told local police that they should not be involved with national 
security matters were factually incorrect. There have been some federal programs that 
have attempted to engage local police in the national security process, including the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), also known as the “If 
You See Something, Say Something” program. This program invites local law 
enforcement to investigate tips reported by the public for credibility of terrorism. If there 
is a possibility of terrorism, the tip should be passed along to the FBI; however, the FBI 
cannot investigate all possible terrorists across the United States, so they rely on local law 
enforcement to investigate initial reports. This brings local law enforcement into the 
terrorism sphere (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). 
There has also been an emphasis by the federal government on critical 
infrastructure protection at the local level (such as communications, energy, food and 
agriculture, government facilities, transportation, and nuclear materials) (“Critical 
Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). Local police are also instrumental in this goal as there is a 




everywhere at once. Local police have become the front line in protecting their local 
critical infrastructure and their local community from terrorism. Some of the officers 
interviewed claimed that they were not involved with national security (Davis, 2010).  
The lack of consensus on national security among the officers that I interviewed 
was interesting. Four officers were able to cite specific programs and ways that they were 
involved in preventing terrorism. This finding suggests that some local police are aware 
that federal law enforcement need their help. However, two officers were adamant that 
the federal government did not want their help with terrorism prevention. It is possible 
that these officers have had a negative encounter with attempting to help federal law 
enforcement and have been put off by this experience. It is also possible that these 
officers were simply unaware of the programs that they were supposed to be participating 
in; however, this is unlikely as one of the officers was a deputy police chief.  
This lack of consensus could mean a few things. It is possible that officers are not 
connecting some of their daily tasks that act as terrorism prevention to national security 
policing. Simple activities such as patrolling areas with critical infrastructure may not 
seem like terrorism prevention to an officer. It could also mean that police officers do not 
know why they are doing what they have been told to do and are simply following orders, 
like the example of patrolling critical infrastructure. 
Local Police Changing 
In addition to national security, there was also a lack of consensus about if and 
how local policing in general had changed. There were no patterns based on rank, 
department, town or country population size, or region of Maine that could be identified 




said that they felt their jobs had more to do with national security. Mike, a police chief, 
and Sally, a detective, both said that they thought that their jobs had nothing to do with 
national security.  
This difference in job perception is important because the role of police should be 
clearly defined and understood by all officers. It is estimated that police officers only 
spend about 5-15% of their time on crime fighting activities (Robinson, 2018). The rest 
of the time is spent on administrative tasks, responding to non-emergent calls for service, 
and providing general public service. Very little time is spent responding to emergencies. 
Terror prevention and critical infrastructure monitoring usually fall into the category of 
patrol or when responding to non-emergent calls for service. It is possible that these 
officers have been told to patrol certain areas but have not been told why or what to look 
for (Aradau, 2020).  
Two officers talked about making connections between departments and more 
collaboration taking place with other parts of the government. These changes have been 
documented. There is more interoperability between departments and more 
communication in general (Kwon, 2009). There are databases that police officers have 
access to at all points in time that contain information on a person's past run-ins with law 
enforcement. Officers use this information when they are responding to non-emergent 
calls for service (“National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” n.d.).  
 It is unclear why some officers were so adamant that there had been no change in 
their jobs. After the first few interviews, I thought that the change in local policing might 
be related to rank. Meaning that police chiefs and other officers higher up in the chain of 




more often and patrol officers would have seen a minimal difference because they are 
more focused on day-to-day activities and the minutiae of policing. This was not the case 
as there was no correlation between any demographic and the perception of local police 
changing. 
Fusion Centers 
The only finding that was generally consistent between the majority of the 
participants was the communication differences between pre-9/11 policing and post-9/11 
policing. The one communication innovation that 7 out of the 10 participants talked about 
was the creation of fusion centers. All the officers that mentioned fusion centers stated 
that they are advantageous to law enforcement. Three officers stated that they had made a 
report to MIAC and two stated that they had been given information about a suspicious 
person from MIAC.  
MIAC is an information hub that receives, analyzes, and shares information. All 
police officers in the state have access to the information. Information is typically 
submitted to MIAC through email by officers. Anytime that an officer submits 
information to MIAC it is analyzed with all the information that MIAC already has. 
MIAC also analyzes the information for terrorism credibility and if there is anything 
actionable it is passed to the FBI or the DHS. MIAC is not an investigative agency, they 
only provide support and analysis to officers (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” 
n.d.).  
Communication, and MIAC in particular, being the only common change that all 
the officers spoke about, is a noteworthy finding because fusion centers are one of the 




controversy surrounding MIAC, including having personal data hacked and leaked, 
mission creep, and accusations of civil rights violations. The “Blueleaks” hack exposed 
the personal information of thousands of people that MIAC had records on (Rhoda, 
2020).  
In addition to this, MIAC has expanded past its original conception of fighting 
terror and into the area of the drug war and monitoring protestors who pose no threat to 
national security (Byrne, 2020). MIAC has also been accused of being racist because they 
collected information on people involved with Black Lives Matter protests and not people 
involved in right wing extremist groups, as well as holding more information on people 
who are part of ethnic and racial minorities in general. (Tipping, 2020). MIAC officials 
claim that they only have more information on minorities because they receive more 
reports about people who are part of minorities through the FBI’s “If You See 
Something, Say Something” program (Byrne, 2020).  
Recommendations 
One recommendation that has come out of this research is clearly defining the 
role of local police officers in Maine. The officers that I interviewed have vastly different 
interpretations of the jobs that they should be doing. Some thought that their job was 
strictly local and had no effect on national security. Other officers understood the role 
that the federal government was asking them to fill. Police officers should have a role that 
is clearly defined and includes terrorism prevention and critical infrastructure protection.  
Another recommendation is the reform of MIAC. Police officers have repeatedly 
stated that MIAC is an important law enforcement tool. They claim that it has helped 




there have also been many issues with MIAC. There was a successful hack that resulted 
in thousands of people's personal information being exposed (Byrne, 2020). In addition to 
this MIAC has exhibited extensive mission creep that has resulted in civil rights 
violations (German, 2007). There have been many people who have called for the 
abolishment of MIAC because of these reasons, including the Maine State Legislature. 
There is currently a bill pending that would defund MIAC because of the results of the 
Senate report on fusion centers that found they are not effective and because of the civil 
rights violations uncovered by the ACLU (German, 2007; Barnosky, 2015).  
Because of this dichotomy, the mission of MIAC should be more clearly defined 
and limited. The Maine State Legislature should pass legislation limiting the scope of 
MIAC to strictly terrorism - the original intent of the organization. The legislation should 
also focus on ensuring the civil rights of the people of Maine. However, the bill currently 
in the legislature goes too far. MIAC does serve a purpose in the terrorism sphere and if it 
were contained to this purpose would be a valuable asset.  
Limitations and Future Research 
One limitation of this study was the small number of participants. The response 
rate was much lower than anticipated. Many officers did not want to participate due to the 
political climate during which the study took place. In addition to this, 11 departments 
declined to participate altogether because of department policies. The goal of a minimum 
of 15 interviews was set at the beginning of the study. This goal was not reached and only 
10 interviews were conducted.  
A second limitation was the demographics of the police officers that were 




to what extent the demographics of the officers influenced their view of policing in 
Maine, but to better understand how policing has changed, a set of officers with a wider 
set of demographic characteristics should be interviewed. Maine does not collect 
demographic data about police officers in the state, so it is unclear how skewed this 
sample is from the population. Maine as a whole is 94.4% White so the sample 
demographics are similar to the state as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). 
In addition to this, there was a lack of geographic diversity among the 
participants. The majority of the officers interviewed were from the southern region of 
the state. There was a significant shortage in all other areas. This is significant because 
the Lewiston area has a high population of Somali immigrants and the officers in this 
area may have vastly different opinions than the officers that were interviewed. There 
was also a lack of officers from areas near the border with Canada. These officers may 
feel that they have more of an impact on national security because of their geographic 
location and the border security actions that they may or may not take.  
A third limitation is that the officers interviewed only focused on the impact of 
Salafism (or Islamic extremism). The officers did not discuss terrorism from White 
Supremacists or any other form of terrorism when talking about their collaborations with 
the federal government. Some officers mentioned incidents of terror attacks by White 
Supremacists, such as the Columbine shooting; however, this was only in passing and as 
an explanation for the evolution of weapons that local police carry.  
It is possible that the framing of the questions caused this narrow definition of 
terrorism to be used, as most of the questions were centered around the 9/11 terrorist 




that allow officers an opportunity to speak about the threat of terrorism from any groups 
including white supremacy groups.  
More studies with higher sample sizes and similar methods could be done to 
better understand what officers think the impact of 9/11 has been for law enforcement in 
the state. Studies with more participants would be able to assess a broader range of 
opinions and get a more in depth understanding of policing in the state. This method 
could also be expanded nationally to understand the differences in regional local policing. 
A study of this nature would be valuable because policing is highly localized.  
Future research would benefit from a less politically charged time. Hopefully, this 
would result in more officers talking to a researcher the officers might be more candid 
with their responses. In addition to this a larger sample would be very valuable, ensuring 
that there would be officers from the Lewiston area. It would be interesting to hear what 
these officers' thoughts are on these topics because the Lewiston area has a high 
population of Somali immigrants. It would also be beneficial to conduct some participant 
observation to see how local police officers in Maine actually use fusion centers and how 
many actions they take to protect the national security of the country. In addition to this, 
interviews with people who participate in the NSI process at all levels would be valuable. 
This would include the officers who investigate the reports, the people who work in 
fusion centers, and FBI agents who investigate the reports that are determined to be 








There has never been a study that focuses on how police in Maine think their jobs 
have changed since 9/11. Overall, there was a lack of consensus among the officers that I 
interviewed on their experiences as local police officers before and after 9/11. There was 
no agreement on if local policing had changed or if national security now makes up a 
larger part of local policing. The only aspect of policing that the majority of police that I 
interviewed agreed on was that there was more emphasis placed on communication 
between local police departments and national security agencies since 9/11 and that 
fusion centers aided in this. This study was relatively small, and the results cannot be 
generalized to the rest of police officers in Maine or the rest of the country. More studies 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INITIAL QUESTIONS 
Demographics-related questions 
Name, rank, department 
Rank and department on 9/11 






Questions pertaining to 9/11 
What was being an officer like before 9/11 
Where were you on 9/11 
Were there any immediate changes to your job after 9/11 
Have these changes been permanent 
Do you feel like your job is now more oriented towards national security 
Have these changes affected the way that you interact with the public 
How has your job changed since 9/11? 
Questions if the officer’s department has received equipment from the defense 
department 
What equipment did your department receive 
Do you think that this equipment has had an impact on the way that you do your job 
What is this equipment used for 
How has having this equipment impacted the community 
How do you feel about having this type of equipment? Has it enhanced your effectiveness 
as a police officer? 
Concluding questions 
After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just 
become a police officer? 
Is there something that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you 
during this interview? 
Is there something else you think I should know to understand the effect of 9/11 on 
policing? 
Is there anything you would like to ask me? 
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 Andrew King was born in Columbus, Ohio on September 21, 1999. He was raised 
in Torrington, Connecticut and South Hadley, Massachusetts. He graduated from South 
Hadley High School in 2017. Andrew double majored in political science and sociology, 
with a concentration in crime, law, and justice. Throughout his time at the University of 
Maine, Andrew enjoyed playing trombone in the pep band and the concert band. Andrew 
is also an EMT and an officer in the University Volunteer Ambulance Corps.  
 Upon graduation, Andrew will spend time volunteering in AmeriCorps with the 
National Civilian Community Corps. 
 
